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Edward J. Imwinkelried† 
Professor Paul Giannelli, (Almost) a Half-Century 
Later: The “Dean” of this Era’s Scientific       
Evidence Scholars 
Law and science are different domains, but they intersect in the 
courtroom. Over the years in a growing number of cases, litigants have 
offered scientific or other expert testimony in court. A Rand 
Corporation study found that parties tendered expert testimony in 86 
percent of the trials and that, on average, there were 3.3 experts per 
trial.1 A later research project found that the average had increased to 
4.3 experts per trial.2 
In the early decades of the twentieth century, legal scholars paid 
little attention to the gradually increasing reliance on expert testimony. 
One notable exception was Dean Henry Wigmore. In several of his 
texts, he addressed the admissibility of expert opinion testimony.3 In 
particular, he was intrigued by such topics as lie detection,4 blood tests,5 
and psychological analysis.6 With the notable exception of Dean 
Wigmore, though, most members of the legal academy of that era, 
including Evidence professors, ignored the topic of expert testimony. 
To be sure, there were a few useful texts on scientific testimony.7 
 
†  Edward L. Barrett, Jr. Professor of Law, Emeritus, University of California, 
Davis; co-author, Giannelli, Imwinkelried, Roth & Campbell 
Moriarty, Scientific Evidence (5th ed. 2012); co-author, Imwinkelried, 
Giannelli, Gilligan, Lederer & Richter, Courtroom Criminal 
Evidence (6th ed. 2016). 
1. Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 Wis. L. Rev. 1113, 1119 (1991). 
2. Ronald J. Allen et al., Evidence: Text, Problems, and Cases 649 
(6th ed. 2011). 
3. E.g., 2 J. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 417a (3d 
ed. 1940); 3 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 795 (Chadbourn rev. 1970); J. 
Wigmore, Science of Judicial Proof § 220 (3d ed. 1937). 
4. 3A J. Wigmore, supra note 3, § 999. 
5. 2 J. Wigmore, supra note 3, § 662(c) (Chadbourn rev. 1979). 
6. 3A J. Wigmore, supra note 4, § 990.  
7. E.g., A. Moenssens & F. Inbau, Scientific Evidence in Criminal 
Cases (1973); James R. Richardson, Modern Scientific Evidence: 
Civil and Criminal (1961). 
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However, many of those texts were largely descriptive. They reviewed 
the science and surveyed the case law but, in most cases, stopped short 
of critically evaluating either the empirical data or the case law. 
Developments in the 1960s forced that attitude to change. During 
that period, the Warren Court rendered a number of landmark consti-
tutional criminal procedure decisions that curtailed the ability of the 
prosecution to introduce testimony about the products of pretrial 
searches, interrogations, and lineups conducted by the police.8 In effect, 
these decisions created “gaps” in prosecution cases.9 To fill those gaps, 
prosecutors turned to forensic science.10 Even if the Fifth or Sixth 
Amendment precluded the prosecution from using the accused’s confes-
sion to prove his presence at the crime scene, the prosecution could use 
a scientific analysis of physical evidence found at the crime scene to do 
so. That development was the primary reason why in 1968 Congress 
created the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (“LEAA”) and 
appropriated millions of dollars to fund research into developing cutting 
edge forensic techniques.11 
These developments in the 1960s cried out for more intense scrutiny 
of the use of science in court. Professor Giannelli would soon undertake 
the task. Professor Giannelli graduated from the University of Virginia 
School of Law in 1970. From 1972 to 1973, he served as a Fellow in the 
Forensic Medicine Program at the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology. 
In 1973, he earned his Master of Science in Forensic Science from 
George Washington University. Later that year he joined the Criminal 
Law Division of the Army’s Judge Advocate General’s School at the 
University of Virginia. He immediately began teaching and writing 
about expert testimony. That subject emerged as the focal point of his 
scholarship when he became a member of the Case Western Reserve 
University School of Law faculty in 1975. Over the next five decades he 
would distinguish himself as one of the premier scientific evidence 
 
8. James W. Osterburg, Forensic Science and the United States Supreme 
Court: The Impact and Significance of Past Decisions, in Legal Medicine 
Annual 1 (C. Wecht ed. 1972) (discussing the Supreme Court’s Miranda, 
Gideon, and Escobedo decisions). 
9. Wilkaan Fong, Criminalistics and the Prosecutor, in The Prosecutor’s 
Deskbook 547 (P. Healy & J. Manak eds. 1971). 
10. Worley v. State, 263 So. 2d 613, 616 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972) (Mager, J., 
concurring) (“In this day and age . . . where recent decisions of the United 
States Supreme Court establish stringent guidelines in the investigative, 
custodial and prosecutorial areas a premium is placed upon the development 
and use of scientific methods of crime detection.”). 
11. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 
82 Stat. 197. The provision creating the LEAA was part of the Omnibus 
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.  
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scholars in the United States—the “dean” of the academics writing in 
this area. 
The 1970s 
In 1923, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia handed 
down its decision in Frye v. United States.12 In Frye, the defense offered 
testimony about a systolic blood pressure test–a predecessor to the 
modern polygraph.13 The theory underlying the test was that if a sub-
ject engaged in a conscious attempt to deceive, the attempt would affect 
his or her blood pressure. According to the theory, by carefully moni-
toring the subject’s blood pressure during an interrogation, the analyst 
could determine whether the subject was being untruthful. In Frye, the 
defense called an expert prepared to testify that in a systolic blood 
pressure test, Frye had truthfully denied committing the charged crime. 
The trial judge excluded the evidence, and the appellate court af-
firmed.14 In the most famous passage in the American law of expert 
testimony, the court declared: 
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line 
between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to 
define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the 
principle must be recognized, and while the courts will go a long 
way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-
recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which 
the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have 
gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it 
belongs.15 
Applying that test, the court affirmed the trial judge’s ruling. The 
court found that the defense had not established that the blood pressure 
test enjoyed widespread acceptance in the pertinent fields—namely, 
psychology and physiology.16 
As the years passed and expert testimony was offered more 
frequently in court, more and more courts adopted the Frye test. By 
the early 1970s, it had become the governing law in both federal 
 
12. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
13. Id. at 1013.  
14. Id. at 1014. 
15. Id. 
16. Id.  
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practice and forty-five states.17 Since expert testimony was relatively 
rare until the developments in the 1960s and early 1970s, it was under-
standable that the early cases embraced Frye rather facilely. However, 
once the judicial system became increasingly reliant on scientific evi-
dence, it was imperative to evaluate Frye more closely. 
Professor Giannelli met that need with his masterful Columbia Law 
Review article, “The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. 
United States, a Half-Century Later.”18 Written in the late 1970s, the 
article was released in 1980. The article represented the first, in depth 
analysis of Frye. Early in the article, Professor Giannelli made the point 
that although Frye had become the overwhelming majority view in the 
United States, the opinion itself neither cited authority nor advanced a 
policy argument for the general acceptance test.19 The “rationale” for 
the test developed as post hoc rationalization by later courts that 
adopted the test.20 Professor Giannelli next noted that even in those 
later decisions, the court’s analysis tended to be generalized and 
conclusory. Professor Giannelli then articulated the nuanced, detailed 
analysis that, to date, neither the courts nor other commentators had 
provided. 
In his analysis, he initially dissected the test to identify the sub-
issues: Who must accept the technique? How should the judge identify 
the scientific fields to which the technique “belonged”?21 What did 
“general acceptance” mean? How widespread did the acceptance have 
to be?22 Precisely what had to be accepted—only the abstract, under-
lying theory or also the more concrete technique implementing the 
theory?23 What methods could the proponent use to prove general ac-
ceptance in the pertinent fields—expert testimony, a literature review, 
or other judicial opinions?24 And, fundamentally, what types of testi-
mony constituted “scientific” evidence subject to the test?25 Professor 
Giannelli not only sorted out these discrete sub-issues, he also compre-
 
17. Betty R. Steingass, Note, Changing the Standard for the Admissibility of 
Novel Scientific Evidence: State v. Williams, 40 Ohio St. L.J. 757, 769 
(1979). 
18. Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. 
United States, a Half-Century Later, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 1197 (1980). 
19. Id. at 1205. 
20. Id. at 1206. 
21. Id. at 1208–10. 
22. Id. at 1210–11. 
23. Id. at 1211–15. 
24. Id. at 1215–19. 
25. Id. at 1219–23. 
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hensively reviewed the case law on each sub-issue and demonstrated 
the confusion among the lower courts. After the comprehensive review, 
Professor Giannelli addressed the policy impact of the state of the law. 
He convincingly demonstrated that while Frye sometimes permitted the 
admission of unreliable evidence, in other instances it resulted in the 
exclusion of highly reliable testimony that would have materially 
advanced a judicial inquiry.26 
At the end of the article, Professor Giannelli called on the courts 
to abandon the Frye test.27 He noted that the Federal Rules of Evidence 
had taken effect a few years earlier in 1975. He outlined a statutory 
construction argument that the enactment of the Rules had impliedly 
superseded Frye.28 He highlighted Federal Rule of Evidence 402, which 
then read “[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise 
provided by the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, 
by these rules, or other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant 
to statutory authority”29 such as the Federal Rules of Civil and 
Criminal Procedure. Frye was a creature of case, and there did not seem 
to be any statutory language that could reasonably bear the interpreta-
tion that it codified a general acceptance test. 
The article became an instant classic. To this date, it remains the 
finest analysis of Frye ever published.30 It is the most cited article on 
the subject of the Frye test. On one occasion or another, every contem-
porary scientific evidence scholar has cited the article. It is a “must” 
read for anyone interested in seriously studying the Frye general accept-
ance test. 
The article not only filled a void in the doctrinal analysis of expert 
testimony. Perhaps even more importantly, it created a template for 
later expert testimony scholarship. The article was a model for scholar-
ship on this subject. First, the article included a thorough, painstaking 
review of the case law on general acceptance test. The footnotes contain 
voluminous citations. Second, the article contained a policy-oriented 
 
26. Id. at 1223–28. 
27. Id. at 1250. 
28. Id. at 1230. 
29. Id. Restyled Rule 402 reads: [R]elevant evidence is admissible unless any of 
the following provides otherwise: the United States Constitution; a federal 
statute; these rules; or other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court. Fed. 
R. Evid. 402. Restyled Rule 101(b)(5) clarified the last phrase in Rule 402: 
“Ín these rules . . . a ‘rule prescribed by the Supreme Court’ means a rule 
adopted by the Supreme Court under statutory authority.” Fed. R. Evid. 
101(b)(5).  
30. Professor Giannelli’s Columbia Law Review piece is the very first article 
excerpted in the scientific evidence section of Edward J. Imwinkelried & 
Glen Weissenberger, An Evidence Anthology 87 (1996). 
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critical evaluation of the test. From the outset, the article developed 
the theme that if expert testimony is to enhance the integrity of judicial 
fact-finding, the testimony admitted must be reliable.31 In analyzing the 
sub-issues, Professor Giannelli explained how the courts’ various, often 
conflicting positions on the sub-issues either increased or decreased the 
probability that the evidence admitted was empirically reliable. 
Thirdly, Professor Giannelli was not content to rely on “common sense” 
speculation about the impact of expert testimony, instead using a meth-
odology now commonplace in first-rank scholarship on this subject; he 
marshaled empirical studies such as investigations of jurors’ ability to 
comprehend certain species of expert testimony.32 To this day Professor 
Giannelli’s article serves as a model for outstanding analyses of 
scientific evidence issues. The best contemporary treatments of the sub-
ject display the same three characteristics as Professor Giannelli’s land-
mark article. And we shall soon see that, to a striking degree, the 
analysis in the article presaged the Supreme Court’s reasoning in its 
celebrated 1993 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals33 decision. 
The 1980s 
After writing his seminal Columbia Law Review article in the late 
1970s, Professor Giannelli undertook an even more ambitious task in 
the 1980s. Early in the decade he decided to author a text on scientific 
evidence. He completed that project and released the first edition in 
1986.34 
The early chapters in the text expanded on the legal analysis he 
had presented in the Columbia Law Review article. For example, 
Chapter 1 was devoted to the Frye test and the competing approaches 
to determine the admissibility of scientific testimony. 
However, Professor Giannelli realized that if judges and attorneys 
were to make more discerning judgments about the reliability of expert 
testimony, they needed to learn more about the science. The first edi-
tion therefore included chapters devoted to such varied subjects as 
neutron activation analysis, polygraphy, hypnosis, and psychological 
testimony about battered woman syndrome.35 Reviewing the research 
related to that wide array of topics was a mammoth challenge. In each 
chapter, Professor Giannelli not only described the current state of the 
 
31. Giannelli, supra note 18, at 1200, 1207, 1245. 
32. Id. at 1240. 
33. 509 U.S. 579 (1993); see infra notes 37–57 and accompanying text. 
34. Paul C. Giannelli & Edward J. Imwinkelried, Scientific Evidence 
(1986). 
35. See generally id. 
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art within the discipline. In addition, he summarized the most trench-
ant criticisms of the discipline. 
The first edition of the treatise reviewed the current state of the 
most popular forensic techniques, and in some sections, the treatise also 
forecast important developments in forensic science. When the first edi-
tion was released, no American court had yet passed on the admis-
sibility of DNA typing. American laboratories were just beginning to 
explore the possibility of importing the forensic techniques developed 
in the United Kingdom. The first edition was prophetic about the im-
portance of the advent of DNA typing: “The genetic laboratories now 
researching DNA may ultimately advance genetic marker analysis far 
beyond the status.”36 
Just as it played a role in introducing some new scientific develop-
ments to the legal community, Professor Giannelli’s treatise would play 
a role in the Supreme Court’s later rendition of the Daubert decision in 
the 1990s. The Court would cite the treatise in its opinion,37 and 
Professor Giannelli would be instrumental in drafting the plaintiff’s 
briefs that persuaded the Court to abandon Frye and announce a new 
reliability-validation test for the admissibility of scientific testimony. 
The 1990s 
As previously stated, the Federal Rules of Evidence took effect in 
1975. As Professor Giannelli had explained, there was a strong statutory 
construction argument that the enactment of the Rules impliedly over-
turned the general acceptance test. The lower federal courts were badly 
divided over that statutory construction issue.38 That division of senti-
ment set the stage for a Supreme Court decision to resolve the split of 
authority. In 1992 the Court granted certiorari in Daubert, which 
squarely posed the question of whether Frye was still good law in federal 
practice.39 
As soon as it was clear that the Court had taken the Daubert case, 
the plaintiffs’ attorneys contacted Professor Giannelli and asked him to 
consult on their briefs. It is true that Professor Giannelli’s name does 
not appear on the briefs. There were two tactical reasons for that. First, 
the plaintiffs’ counsel had already decided to rely on Professor 
 
36. Id. § 17-8(E); Edward J. Imwinkelried, DNA and the Criminal 
Justice System: The Relative Priority that Should Be Assigned 
to Trial Stage DNA Issues 91 (David Lazer, ed. 2004). 
37. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 585 n.3, 587 n.5. 
38. See Paul C. Giannelli & Edward J. Imwinkelried, Scientific 
Evidence §§ 1-5-6 (4th ed. 2007). 
39. Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Daubert Decision: Frye Is Dead, Long Live 
the Federal Rules of Evidence, Trial, Sept. 1993, at 60, 61. 
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Giannelli’s treatise as authority. The counsel decided that the references 
to the treatise would carry more weight if Professor Giannelli did not 
assume a clearly adversary role in the litigation. Second, by this time 
Professor Giannelli’s writings on the subject were voluminous. The 
plaintiffs’ counsel feared that if Professor Giannelli were a named 
counsel, the defense would scour his writings to find any passage at all 
inconsistent with the contents of the plaintiffs’ briefs.40 In any event, 
although Professor Giannelli was not designated as counsel, he was 
instrumental in drafting the briefs. 
In 1993, the Court released its opinion.41 The opinion bears the 
imprint of Professor Giannelli’s scholarship.42 At one point, Justice 
Blackmun cites Professor Giannelli’s Columbia article.43 There are also 
two citations to Professor Giannelli’s treatise, the first appearing in 
footnote 3. The first two footnotes merely recite the background of the 
plaintiffs’ and defense expert witnesses. Footnote 3 is the first to invoke 
any legal authority, and the very first authority cited is Professor 
Giannelli’s treatise. 
Professor Giannelli’s imprint on the opinion is more than citation 
deep. To a striking degree, the analysis in his Columbia article antici-
pated Justice Blackmun’s reasoning in Daubert. 
The Justice’s first ruling in Daubert was that after the enactment 
of the Federal Rules, Frye was no longer good law.44 He based that 
ruling on statutory construction. As previously stated, in his article 
Professor Giannelli sketched a statutory interpretation argument for 
abandoning Frye.45 More specifically, he had contended that Federal 
Rule 402 could be construed as abolishing uncodified, case law restric-
tions such as Frye.46 Justice Blackmun premised his ruling on an iden-
tical interpretation of Rule 402.47 
The Justice’s second ruling was that the reference to 
“scientific . . . knowledge” in Rule 702 ought to be construed as 
supplanting Frye with a new reliability-validation test. According to 
 
40. An amicus supporting Merrell Dow selected as its counsel an Evidence 
professor who had written an article that lent support to the petitioners’ 
position. Needless to say, the petitioners made that point in their rebuttal 
brief in the case.  
41. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 579. 
42. Fittingly, Professor Giannelli was chosen to write the article about Daubert 
in Evidence Stories 181–206 (R. Lempert ed. 2006). 
43. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 586 n.4. 
44. Id. at 585–89. 
45. Giannelli, supra note 18, at 1230. 
46. Id. 
47. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587–88. 
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Justice Blackmun, under Rule 702 the trial judge has a “gatekeeping” 
responsibility to ensure that “any and all scientific testimony or evi-
dence admitted is . . . reliable.”48 Thirteen years earlier, Professor 
Giannelli had written that “[f]or [scientific] evidence to contribute to 
the truth-determining function of a trial, it must be reliable.”49 The 
Justice added that the reliability of a theory depends on its scientific 
validity.50 Earlier, Professor Giannelli had written that a scientific 
technique cannot be considered reliable unless it is valid.51 In the 
Justice’s view, to be valid, a scientific theory must be empirically 
testable “and . . . [in fact] tested.”52 A theory is reliable only if it is 
“supported by [adequate empirical] validation . . . ”53 Professor 
Giannelli’s article had asserted that “[e]mpirical validation should be 
recognized as” a “method of establishing the reliability of a [scientific] 
technique;”54 the technique should be “validated empirically.”55 Later in 
its 1997 decision in General Electric Co. v. Joiner,56 the Supreme Court 
expanded on Daubert; Joiner declared that in assessing whether a 
particular empirical study sufficiently validates a theory or technique, 
the trial judge must evaluate the propriety of the extrapolation from 
the data in the study to the facts of the pending case.57 Professor 
Giannelli anticipated even that later modification to the Daubert test 
in his article.58 
Professor Giannelli was not only prescient about the substance of 
the Daubert’s reliability-validation test; he also anticipated Justice 
Blackmun’s procedural prescriptions for administering the new test. In 
Daubert, the Justice announced that the proponent of the evidence 
would have the burden of proof on the issue of reliability.59 In his article, 
Professor Giannelli had reached the same conclusion as to the proper 
allocation of the burden.60 Justice Blackmun specified that in deciding 
 
48. Id. at 589. 
49. Giannelli, supra note 18, at 1200; see also id. at 1207, 1245. 
50. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590. 
51. Giannelli, supra note 18, at 1202. 
52. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593. 
53. Id. at 590. 
54. Giannelli, supra note 18, at 1213. 
55. Id. at 1227. 
56. 522 U.S. 136 (1997). 
57. See id. at 146. 
58. See Giannelli, supra note 18, at 1213. 
59. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592. 
60. See Giannelli, supra note 18, at 1247. 
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whether the proponent’s foundational testimony satisfied the burden, 
the trial judge should follow the preliminary fact-finding procedures 
codified in Federal Rule 104(a).61 Thirteen years earlier, Professor 
Giannelli had likewise stated that it would be sensible to require a trial 
judge passing on the admissibility of scientific testimony to follow Rule 
104(a).62 
When the dust settled at the end of the Daubert litigation, in many 
respects the Supreme Court had moved the law of expert testimony in 
the direction that Professor Giannelli had urged over a decade earlier. 
The 2000s 
As forensic science entered a new decade in the 2000s, the scholarly 
debates over the reliability of several forensic disciplines intensified.63 
In a growing number of cases, defense counsel were mounting attacks 
on types of forensic testimony, such as document examination64 and 
firearms identification,65 that had been admitted routinely under the 
Frye standard. To better equip federal judges to evaluate these chal-
lenges, the Federal Judicial Center, in conjunction with the National 
 
61. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592. Restyled Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a) now 
reads: “In General. The court must decide any preliminary question about 
whether a witness is qualified, a privilege exists, or evidence is admissible. In 
so deciding, the court is not bound by evidence rules, except those on 
privilege.” Fed. R. Evid. 104(a). When Rule 104(a) governs, the judge 
serves as a factfinder. Rule 104(b) prescribes the procedure for deciding such 
preliminary facts as whether a lay witness has personal knowledge under 
Federal Rule 602 or whether an exhibit is authentic under Rule 901. When 
104(b) controls, the judge has a much more limited, screening rule. Restyled 
Federal Rule of Evidence 104(b) provides: “Relevance That Depends on a 
Fact. When the relevance of evidence depends on whether a fact exists, proof 
must be introduced sufficient to support a finding that the fact does exist.” 
Fed. R. Evid. 104(b). Thus, the judge does not decide whether the fact 
exists, as the judge does under 104(a). Instead, the judge inquires only 
whether the proponent’s foundational testimony has sufficient probative 
value to permit the trier of fact to rationally conclude that the fact exists. 
62. Giannelli, supra note 18, at 1247. 
63. See Mark Hansen, John Hancock, 83 A.B.A. J. 76 (1997) (describing the 
questioning of handwriting analysis). Compare D. Michael Risinger & 
Michael Saks, Science and Nonscience in the Courts: Daubert Meets 
Handwriting Identification Expertise, 82 Iowa L. Rev. 21, 65–66 (1996) with 
Andre Moenssens, Handwriting Identification Evidence in the Post-Daubert 
World, 66 UMKC L. Rev. 251, 328–331 (1997). 
64. See 2 Paul C. Giannelli, Edward J. Imwinkelried, Andrea Roth & 
Jane Campbell Moriarty, Scientific Evidence § 21.07[a] (5th ed. 
2012). 
65. See 1 Giannelli, Imwinkelried, Roth & Moriarty, supra note 64, 
§ 14.06. 
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Research Council, prepared a Reference Manual on Scientific 
Evidence.66 The manual included chapters, authored by leading experts, 
on such subjects as DNA typing, statistics, epidemiology, engineering, 
and mental health evidence. Every federal judge received a copy of the 
manual. Assume that a federal judge was assigned a case dealing with 
a type of expert testimony that he or she had never previously dealt 
with but which was covered in a chapter in the manual. The judge 
could reach for the manual and find an expert primer about the disci-
pline. The manual quickly became a “go to” text for federal trial judges. 
Since scientific research was ongoing, the Judicial Center found it 
necessary to release a second edition of the manual and then a third. 
There was a conspicuous omission from the first two editions: a treat-
ment of forensic science. As previously stated, the debates over the 
reliability of forensic evidence had become heated. The topic became 
even more pressing when, in 2009, the National Research Council 
(“NRC”) released its report entitled “Strengthening Forensic Science 
in the United States: A Path Forward”.67 The report included a number 
of pointed criticisms of forensic disciplines. Although many fingerprint 
examiners use the ACE-V—analysis, comparison, evaluation, 
verification—methodology, the NRC characterized ACE-V as “a 
broadly stated framework” that “is not specific enough to qualify as a 
validated method for this type of analysis.”68 The report also stated 
that “not enough is known about the variabilities among individ-
ual . . . guns” to have any “given level of confidence in the result” of a 
purported firearms identification.69 The report “found no scientific 
support for the use of [microscopic] hair comparisons for individ-
ualization . . . .”70 The report damned questioned-document analysis 
with faint praise when it added that there “may be some value in 
handwriting analysis.”71 
As previously stated, the Judicial Center had released two editions 
of its manual without a chapter devoted to forensic science; but after 
the NRC released its 2009 report, it was no longer possible for the center 
to ignore the topic. Since the topic had become so controversial, how-
ever, the center needed to find an author with an impeccable scholarly 
 
66. Fed. Judical Ctr., Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence (1st 
ed. 1994). 
67. Comm. on Identifying the Needs of the Forensic Sci. Cmty., Nat’l 
Research Council, Strengthening Forensic Science in the United 
States: A Path Forward (2009) [hereinafter A Path Forward]. 
68. Id. at 142. 
69. Id. at 154. 
70. Id. at 161. 
71. Id. at 167. 
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reputation who would command respect from all sides. Predictably, the 
center selected Professor Giannelli to be the lead author.72 For the first 
time, the manual now includes sections devoted to fingerprint exam-
ination, handwriting evidence, firearms identification, bite mark 
analysis, and hair microscopy. To maximize its utility, each section 
surveys the relevant empirical research as well as the pertinent case 
law. The chapter displays the balance and objectivity that have always 
characterized Professor Giannelli’s scholarship. In some instances, the 
chapter approves of the courts’ decision to find the empirical validation 
sufficient. By way of example, the chapter states that a confident 
fingerprint identification is possible when the examiner compares two 
clear sets of ten fingerprints.73 In other instances, the chapter faults the 
courts for accepting expert claims too readily. In particular, the chapter 
identifies a number of troubling gaps in the empirical investigations of 
bite mark identification.74 
The 2010s 
It is an understatement to say that in this decade, Professor 
Giannelli has continued his scholarly work. He has released an impres-
sive number of new law review articles75 as well as new editions of sev-
eral of his treatises, including a fifth edition of “Scientific Evidence.”76 
Although the pace of Professor Giannelli’s scholarly productivity 
has consistently been extraordinary, over the years there has been a 
shift in its focus. His early works, including the Columbia article, prima-
rily addressed the doctrinal legal issue of the admissibility of scientific 
testimony. However, he has increasingly turned his attention to broader 
72. Paul C. Giannelli, Edward J. Imwinkelried & Joseph L. Peterson, Reference 
Guide on Forensic Identification Evidence, in Fed. Judicial Ctr., 
Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence 55 (3d ed. 2011).
73. Id. at 73.
74. Id. at 108–10.
75. See, e.g., Paul C. Giannelli, Forensic Science: Daubert’s Failure, 68 Case
W. Res. L. Rev. 869 (2018); Paul C. Giannelli, Regulating DNA 
Laboratories: The New Gold Standard, 69 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 617 
(2013); Paul C. Giannelli, Junk Science and the Execution of an Innocent 
Man, 7 N.Y.U. J. L. & Lib. 221 (2013); Paul C. Giannelli, Confrontation, 
Experts, and Rule 703, 20 J.L. & Pol’y 443 (2012); Paul C. Giannelli, 
Forensic Science Reform, 90 Tex. L. Rev. 29 (2011); Paul C. Giannelli, 
Forensic Science: Why No Research?, 38 Fordh. Urban L.J. 503 (2011).
76. Paul C. Giannelli, Edward J. Imwinkelried, Andrea Roth & Jane 
Campbell Moriarty, Scientific Evidence (5th ed. 2012); see also 
Edward J. Imwinkelried, Paul C. Giannelli, Francis A. Gilligan, 
Frederic I. Lederer & Liesa Richter, Courtroom Criminal 
Evidence (6th ed. 2016). 
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issues of the systemic reform of forensic science. At the macro level, he 
has written extensively about the need to make crime laboratories 
independent of police departments and district attorney offices.77 His 
own research and studies such as the 2009 NRC report have under-
scored the extent to which forensic scientists rely on subjective judg-
ment rather than objective, quantified standards. The reliance on 
subjective judgment creates room for the play of bias. Especially when 
the laboratory depends on the police department for funding, there is 
the risk that a pro-prosecution bias will affect the exercise of the sub-
jective judgment. At the micro level, he has repeatedly cautioned about 
the cognitive biases,78 including confirmation bias,79 that can distort the 
judgment of the individual analyst. 
Professor Giannelli has long appreciated that reform efforts will 
succeed only if the bench and bar have a much more sophisticated un-
derstanding of the science in forensic “science.” To make science more 
accessible to those audiences, he has poured out specialized articles 
tailored for those groups. He has written tens of articles in the Public 
Defender Reporter. Between 1991 and 2012, he also authored tens of 
articles on forensic science for Criminal Law Bulletin, one of the leading 
periodicals for criminal practitioners, judges, prosecutors, and defense 
counsel. Since 2001 he has served as the scientific evidence columnist 
for Criminal Justice, the principal periodical of the Criminal Justice 
Section of the American Bar Association. 
Scientific and criminal justice organizations took notice that 
Professor Giannelli was so willing to donate his time to the cause of 
reforming forensic science. He was invited to serve as the co-chair of 
the A.B.A. Ad Hoc Innocence Committee to Ensure the Integrity of the 
Criminal Process. He was named reporter for both the A.B.A. group 
that promulgated Criminal Justice Standards on Biological Evidence 
and the Study Committee on DNA Evidence of the National Conference 
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. He was either a member of 
or reviewer for several National Research Council studies: the Planning 
Group on the DNA Project, the Evaluation of Forensic DNA Evidence, 
The Polygraph and Lie Detection, and the 2009 NRC Report itself. 
Given his longstanding commitment to the reform of forensic 
science, it is only fitting that in 2014 he was appointed a Commissioner 
on the new National Commission on Forensic Science, established by 
 
77. Paul C. Giannelli, Forensic Science Reform, 90 Tex. L. Rev. 29 (2011); 
Paul C. Giannelli, Wrongful Convictions: The Need to Regulate Crime Labs, 
86 N.C. L. Rev. 163 (2007); Paul C. Giannelli, Crime Labs Need 
Improvement, Issues in Sci. & Tech., Fall 2003, at 55; Paul C. Giannelli, 
The Abuse of Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases: The Need for 
Independent Crime Laboratories, 4 Va. J. Social Pol’y & L. 439 (1997). 
78. Paul C. Giannelli, Cognitive Bias in Forensic Science, Crim. Just., Summer 
2010, at 61. 
79. Paul C. Giannelli, Confirmation Bias, Crim. Just., Fall 2007, at 60. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 68·Issue 3·2018 
Tribute to Professor Paul Giannelli 
714 
the Department of Justice. His long record of public service and deep 
understanding of both the legal and scientific aspects of expert testi-
mony made him uniquely well qualified for this prestigious position. 
After years of advocating for change, he was in a position to effect 
change. 
Conclusion 
The 2016 report of the President’s Council of Advisors on Science 
and Technology, Forensic Science in Criminal Courts: Ensuring 
Scientific Validity of Feature-Comparison Methods,80 and the National 
Research Council’s 2009 report, Strengthening Forensic Science In The 
United States: A Path Forward,81 are arguably the two most important 
modern reports on the state of American forensic science. Even a quick 
perusal of those reports demonstrates the lasting impact that Professor 
Giannelli has had on the evolution of law and policy in this area. The 
PCAST report contains three citations to Professor Giannelli’s writ-
ing,82 including the Columbia article.83 The NRC report contains ten 
citations,84 also including, of course, the Columbia article.85 
Today there is a large, dynamic group of legal scholars studying the 
problems raised in the NRC report. A partial list would include, in 
alphabetical order, the names of such exceptional academics as the late 
Erica Beecher-Monas,86 David Bernstein, Edward Cheng, Jane 
Campbell Moriarty, Jules Epstein, David Faigman, Brandon Garrett, 
Samuel Gross, Carol Henderson, David Kaye, Jonathan Koehler, 
Jennifer Mnookin, Erin Murphy, Peter Neufeld, Michael Risinger, 
Andrea Roth, Michael Saks, and Joseph Sanders. When Professor 
Giannelli began working in this field in the mid-1970s, only a handful 
of scholars recognized the problems posed by the increasing reliance on 
scientific evidence. In the Columbia article that he wrote almost four 
decades ago, Professor Giannelli identified many of the issues that con-
temporary scholars continue to explore. In part, the academic interest 
 
80. Pres. Council Advisors on Sci. & Tech., Report to the President: 
Forensic Science in Criminal Courts: Ensuring Scientific Validity 
of Feature-Comparison Methods (2016) [hereinafter PCAST]. 
81. A Path Forward, supra note 67. 
82. PCAST, supra note 80, at 34, 41–42. 
83. Id. at 41. 
84. A Path Forward, supra note 67, at 6, 12, 44, 85, 88–89, 96, 161, 187, 194.  
85. Id. at 89 n. 18. 
86. Tragically, last summer Professor Beecher-Monas passed away. She was such 
a serious student of scientific evidence that in her last week, she worked on 
the expert testimony chapter of her Evidence coursebook from her hospital 
bed. 
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in these issues has grown so dramatically because of Professor 
Giannelli’s inspiring example as a scholar, teacher, and law reformer. 
The scientific and legal communities owe Professor Giannelli an enor-
mous debt; he has played a pioneering role in helping to realize the 
potential contribution that science can make to enhancing the integrity 
of judicial fact-finding. Simply stated, Professor Giannelli is a great 
credit to Case Western Reserve University Law School and the legal 
academy. 
